IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

William Penn School District; Panther Valley School District; The School District of Lancaster; Greater Johnstown School District; Wilkes-Barre Area School District; Shenandoah Valley School District; Jamella and Bryant Miller, parents of K.M., a minor; Sheila Armstrong, parent of S.A., minor; Barbara Nemeth, parent of C.M., minor; Tracey Hughes, parent of P.M.H., minor; Pennsylvania Association of Rural and Small Schools; and The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People-Pennsylvania State Conference, Petitioners	:	
v.	:	No. 587 M.D. 2014
	:	Heard: March 2, 2021
Pennsylvania Department of Education; Jake Corman, in his official capacity as President Pro-Tempore of the Pennsylvania Senate; Bryan Cutler, in his official capacity as the Speaker of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives; Tom W. Wolf, in his official capacity as the Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; Pennsylvania State Board of Education; and Pedro Rivera, in his official capacity as the Acting Secretary of Education, Respondents	:	

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER **FILED: March 8, 2021**

Presently before the Court is an Application for Partial Summary Relief (Application) filed by Senator Jake Corman, President Pro-Tempore of the Pennsylvania Senate,[1] pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1532(b), Pa.R.A.P. 1532(b).[2] The Application requests that the Court dismiss the claims of two parent-Petitioners on the basis that their children graduated and, therefore, the claims those Petitioners assert are moot. The Petitioners, Sheila Armstrong and Tracey Hughes, admit their children, S.A. and P.M.H., have graduated from high school but argue their claims should not be dismissed because they also asserted claims on their own behalf, Armstrong has another minor child who still attends the same school district as her child who graduated, and the public importance exception to the mootness doctrine applies. Because the issue presented in this matter is one of great public importance, the Court denies the Application.

I. BACKGROUND

In 2014, Armstrong and Hughes, along with other parents, various school districts, and other organizations (collectively Petitioners), filed a Petition for Review in the Nature of an Action for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (Petition) in this Court's original jurisdiction, naming various government entities and officials as Respondents, including the President Pro-Tempore of the Senate (now Senator Corman), and challenging the constitutionality of the Commonwealth's public school funding arrangement. According to the Petition, Armstrong brought the

[1] Although the Application was filed by then President Pro-Tempore Joseph B. Scarnati III, Senator Corman was substituted as a party respondent pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 502(c), Pa.R.A.P. 502(c), upon Senator Scarnati's retirement. Therefore, the Court will refer to the Application as Senator Corman's.

[2] Rule 1532(b) provides: "At any time after the filing of a petition for review in an appellate or original jurisdiction matter, the court may on application enter judgment if the right of the applicant thereto is clear." Pa.R.A.P. 1532(b).

action on behalf of her minor child, S.A., then 12 years old, and on her own behalf. (Petition ¶ 32.) In 2014 when the Petition was filed, S.A. attended Spring Garden School within the School District of Philadelphia after having attended another school which closed due to budget deficits. The Petition details the alleged issues with the school ranging from the facilities to staffing to supplies and S.A.'s performance in school and on standardized tests, which the Petition alleges "is the direct result of the Commonwealth's failure to provide his school and school district with sufficient resources." (*Id.* ¶¶ 35-39.)

Similar to Armstrong, Hughes brought the action on behalf of her minor child, P.M.H., then 13 years old, as well as on her own behalf. (*Id.* ¶ 67.) At the time, P.M.H. attended E.L. Meyers Junior/Senior High School within the Wilkes-Barre Area School District. According to the Petition, P.M.H. performed well in school until his class sizes started to increase. In addition to large class sizes, the Petition alleges other issues such as lack of sufficient books and lack of tutoring availability. The Petition avers "P.M.H.'s inability to meet state proficiency standards is directly affected by Respondents' failure to provide his school and district with sufficient resources in compliance with the Pennsylvania Constitution." (*Id.* ¶ 73.)

The Petition contains two counts. In count I, Petitioners assert that the Respondents have violated the Education Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution[3] "by failing to provide [school districts] with resources sufficient to enable the districts to ensure that all students . . . have an opportunity to obtain an adequate education that prepares them to meet state academic standards and prepares them for civic, economic, and social success." (*Id.* ¶ 304.) Petitioners further aver that "[t]he

[3] Article III, section 14 states that "[t]he General Assembly shall provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of public education to serve the needs of the Commonwealth." PA. CONST. art. III, § 14.

current levels and allocation of public-school funding are irrational, arbitrary, and not reasonably calculated to ensure that all Pennsylvania school children have access to an adequate education that prepares them to meet state academic standards and prepares them for civic, economic, and social success." (*Id.* ¶ 305.) In count II, Petitioners assert that Respondents violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution[4] "[b]y adopting a school-financing arrangement that discriminates against an identifiable class of students who reside in school districts with low incomes and property values, and by denying those students an equal opportunity to obtain an adequate education that will prepare them for civil, economic, and social success . . . ." (*Id.* ¶ 310.)

In the prayer for relief, Petitioners request that the Court:

- Declare that public education is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Pennsylvania Constitution to all school-age children, residing in the Commonwealth;

- Declare that the Education Clause . . . imposes upon Respondents an obligation to adopt a school-financing arrangement that is reasonably calculated to ensure that all students in Pennsylvania have an opportunity to obtain an adequate education that will enable them to meet state academic standards and participate meaningfully in the economic, civic, and social activities of our society;

- Declare that the Education Clause . . . requires Respondents to provide school districts with the support necessary to ensure that all

[4] Article III, section 32 states that "[t]he General Assembly shall pass no local or special law in any case which has been and can be provided for by general law . . . ." PA. CONST. art. III, § 32. *See also* article I, sections 1 and 26 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, PA. CONST. art. I, §§ 1 ("All men are born equally free and independent, and have inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing and protecting property and reputation, and of pursuing their own happiness."), and 26 ("Neither the Commonwealth nor any political subdivision thereof shall deny to any person the enjoyment of any civil right, nor discriminate against any person in the exercise of any civil right.").

students in Pennsylvania have the opportunity to obtain an adequate education that will enable them to meet state academic standards and participate meaningfully in the economic, civic, and social activities of our society;

- Declare that the existing school-financing arrangement fails to comply with the mandate of the Education Clause, in violation of the rights of [] Petitioners;

- Declare that [the Equal Protection Clause] imposes upon Respondents an obligation to adopt a school-financing arrangement that does not discriminate against students based on the amount of incomes and taxable property in their school districts;

- Declare that the existing school-financing arrangement violates [the Equal Protection Clause] by providing students, who reside in school districts with high property values and incomes, the opportunity to meet state standards and obtain an adequate education and to access expanded educational opportunities, while denying students who reside in school districts with low property values and incomes those same opportunities;

- Declare that the education funding disparity among school districts with high property values and incomes and school districts with low property values and incomes is not justified by any compelling government interest and is not rationally related to any legitimate government objective;

- Declare that Respondents, through the implementation of the Pennsylvania school-financing arrangement, have violated and are violating the constitutional rights of each and all of [] Petitioners;

- Enter permanent injunctions compelling Respondents to establish, fund, and maintain a thorough and efficient system of public education that provides all students in Pennsylvania with an equal opportunity to obtain an adequate education that will enable them to meet state academic standards and participate meaningfully in the economic, civic, and social activities of our society;

- Enter permanent injunctions compelling [] Respondents, after a reasonable period of time, to develop a school-funding arrangement that complies with the Education Clause and the Equal Protection Clause, to cease implementing a school-funding arrangement that

> does not assure that adequate, necessary, and sufficient funds are available to school districts to provide their students with an equal opportunity to obtain an adequate education that will enable them to meet state academic standards and participate meaningfully in the economic, civic, and social activities of our society; and
>
> - Retain continuing jurisdiction over this matter until such time as the Court has determined that Respondents have, in fact, fully and properly fulfilled its orders[.]

(*Id.* ¶¶ 312-22.)[5]

Following preliminary objections,[6] Respondents filed answers with new matter, to which Petitioners responded, thereby closing the pleadings. The matter progressed through discovery pursuant to a case management order issued by the Court. The case management order also set a deadline for the filing of dispositive motions. The instant Application was filed consistent with that order.[7]

II. PARTIES' ARGUMENTS[8]

Senator Corman argues that Armstrong and Hughes should be dismissed as Petitioners as their children, S.A. and P.M.H., have graduated and are no longer

[5] The Petition also asks the Court to award costs and grant such other relief as the Court deems just and proper. (Petition ¶¶ 323-24.)

[6] *See Wm. Penn Sch. Dist. v. Pa. Dep't of Educ.*, 114 A.3d 456 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (en banc) (*William Penn I*), *rev'd by* 170 A.3d 414 (Pa. 2017) (*William Penn II*); and *Wm. Penn Sch. Dist. v. Pa. Dep't of Educ.* (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 587 M.D. 2014, filed May 7, 2018) (en banc) (*William Penn III*).

[7] The State Board of Education also filed an application for summary relief, which the Court denied by separate memorandum opinion and order. *Wm. Penn Sch. Dist. v. Pa. Dep't of Educ.* (Pa. Cmwlth, No. 587 M.D. 2014, filed Feb. 19, 2021).

[8] Respondent Bryan Cutler, Speaker of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives, submitted a letter stating he supports the Application. Executive Respondents, Governor Tom Wolf, Acting Secretary of Education Noe Ortega, who assumed the position upon Pedro Rivera's resignation, and the Pennsylvania Department of Education take no position on the Application, as does the State Board of Education, another respondent.

students of any school district. Accordingly, they "would not benefit from the forward-looking equitable relief that Petitioners request in the Petition." (Application ¶ 21.) Senator Corman also argues Armstrong and Hughes "no longer have a personal stake in the outcome of this litigation" and "[e]ven if this Court grants the relief that Petitioners request, S.A. and P.M.H. would not personally benefit from that relief." (*Id.* ¶ 22.) Because the Court can no longer grant the relief requested to Armstrong or Hughes on behalf of S.A. and P.M.H., their claims are moot, Senator Corman contends. He further argues that courts are to refrain from ruling on moot issues, particularly ones involving constitutional claims. Senator Corman argues there are exceptions to the mootness doctrine, but none of them are applicable here. He asserts that Armstrong's and Hughes's claims are not capable of repetition yet likely to evade review, one of the exceptions to mootness, because even if these Petitioners are dismissed, the entire action will not be dismissed, and the Court will continue to hear and decide the constitutional issues raised by the Petition. Senator Corman also argues that the great public importance exception is inapplicable. While the Petition raises important issues, Senator Corman argues the claims of Armstrong and Hughes are the same as the other Petitioners, so the claims will advance even if Armstrong and Hughes are dismissed as Petitioners. Senator Corman asserts "Armstrong and Hughes do not claim that S.A. and P.M.H. were treated differently than other students who attended their school districts or possess a cause of action that only they can raise." (Senator Corman's Brief (Br.) at 14.) Rather, "the claims [] Armstrong and [] Hughes assert on behalf of S.A. and P.M.H. implicate the same legal issues and involve the same requests for relief as the claims that the other Petitioners are asserting in this action." (*Id.* 14-15.) Finally, Senator Corman argues that S.A. and P.M.H. will not suffer any "detriment" since they have

graduated. (*Id.* at 15.) Accordingly, Senator Corman asks the Court to dismiss Armstrong's and Hughes's claims as moot.

Armstrong and Hughes admit S.A. and P.M.H. have graduated and do not have a personal stake in the litigation, but deny that S.A. and P.M.H. will not benefit if the Court finds in their favor. (Answer with New Matter to Application ¶¶ 21-22.) Armstrong and Hughes argue they asserted claims on behalf of their children, as well as on their own behalf, and courts have long recognized that parents may bring such claims. Armstrong further explains that she has a younger child who attended the same school as her older child and the younger child is still within the School District of Philadelphia facing the same issues faced by her older child.[9] Attached to Petitioners' brief is an affidavit from Armstrong providing same.[10] Therefore, Armstrong argues she personally has an ongoing interest in the action and cites *Steele v. Van Buren Public School District*, 845 F.2d 1492 (8th Cir. 1988), for support that having another child in a district is sufficient to preclude a finding of mootness when one child graduates. In addition, Armstrong and Hughes argue that, even if their claims are technically moot, the public importance exception to the mootness doctrine applies, citing the Supreme Court's decision in *William Penn School District v. Pennsylvania Department of Education*, 170 A.3d 414 (Pa. 2017) (*William Penn II*). They argue that the test for whether the public importance

[9] Armstrong first raises this argument in what is labeled "New Matter" to Petitioners' Answer to the Application. In response, Senator Corman moves to strike the "New Matter" as improper. While the Court is not aware of any rule or precedent permitting "new matter" to be filed in response to an application for summary relief, the Court does not find it necessary to strike it. From a review of the filings, it is clear that Petitioners intended the "New Matter" to assert bases for why the Application should be denied.

[10] Armstrong and Hughes also append excerpts from their respective depositions and from the depositions of various individuals, including P.M.H., detailing the issues they have observed within the school districts.

exception applies is whether the **issue** is one of public importance. Petitioners argue there is no caselaw distinguishing when some of the petitioners' claims may be moot and some not and the focus is, instead, on the issue itself. Finally, Petitioners argue that Armstrong and Hughes are the only parent-Petitioners whose children attended the School District of Philadelphia or Wilkes-Barre Area School District. Accordingly, Petitioners ask the Court to deny the Application.

Senator Corman responds that Petitioners are improperly trying to amend the Petition to state a claim on behalf of Armstrong's younger child, which they cannot do via a brief. Senator Corman points out that, although the Supreme Court previously stated, when this matter was before it on preliminary objections, that some of the allegations were then dated and may need to be amended, Petitioners have yet to formally do so more than three years later. Moreover, Senator Corman argues Respondents would be prejudiced by such an amendment, as discovery has since closed and Armstrong's younger child was not part of discovery. Senator Corman also argues that *Steele*, upon which Petitioners rely, is distinguishable because a review of the caption reveals the parent in that matter brought the claim on behalf of three children, not one, as Armstrong did. He further argues that Armstrong and Hughes are not asserting an as-applied constitutional challenge and seeking relief specific to them; rather, they, along with the other Petitioners, are asserting a facial challenge and seeking statewide relief, which can still be obtained if the other Petitioners prevail on their claims.

Petitioners dispute that Respondents will experience any prejudice, asserting at oral argument that Petitioners have produced and will continue to supplement discovery materials related to Armstrong's younger child, who was just five years old when the Petition was filed in 2014, and are willing to produce more, if

necessary. However, Petitioners argue that amendment is unnecessary given that Armstrong has asserted a claim as a parent, and that requiring amendment would delay trial in a case where amendment would be constantly needed because of continuously changing conditions, as recognized by the Supreme Court.

III. DISCUSSION

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1532(b) provides that "[a]t any time after the filing of a petition for review in an appellate or original jurisdiction matter, the court may on application enter judgment if the right of the applicant thereto is clear." Pa.R.A.P. 1532(b). Applications for summary relief are evaluated like motions for summary judgment. *Flagg v. Int'l Union, Sec., Police, Fire Pros. of Am., Local 506*, 146 A.3d 300, 305 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016). "In ruling on a motion for summary relief, th[e] court must view the evidence of record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party . . . ." *Nw. Youth Servs., Inc. v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare*, 1 A.3d 988, 990 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). "The Court may grant summary relief . . . where the moving party establishes that the case is clear and free from doubt, that there exist no genuine issues of material fact to be tried and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." *Commonwealth ex rel. Pappert v. Coy*, 860 A.2d 1201, 1204 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004).

Senator Corman contends that his Application should be granted because Armstrong's and Hughes's claims are mooted by their children's graduation from high school. Generally, a court will not decide a moot issue. *Pub. Def. Off. of Venango Cnty. v. Venango Cnty. Ct. of Common Pleas*, 893 A.2d 1275, 1279 (Pa. 2006). "The mootness doctrine requires that an actual case or controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the [petition] is filed." *Id.*

(quoting *Pap's A.M. v. City of Erie*, 812 A.2d 591, 600 (Pa. 2002)). An actual case or controversy exists where there is:

> (1) a legal controversy that is real and not hypothetical, (2) a legal controversy that affects an individual in a concrete manner so as to provide the factual predicate for a reasoned adjudication, and (3) a legal controversy with sufficiently adverse parties so as to sharpen the issues for judicial resolution. . . . Courts will not enter judgments or decrees to which no effect can be given.

Phila. Pub. Sch. Notebook v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 49 A.3d 445, 448 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012) (citations omitted). Because "[j]udicial intervention is appropriate only where the underlying controversy is real and concrete, rather than abstract," it is "well settled that the courts do not render decisions in the abstract or offer purely advisory opinions." *Harris v. Rendell*, 982 A.2d 1030, 1035 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009) (internal quotations omitted). Further, "courts are even more reluctant to decide moot questions which raise constitutional issues[] because constitutional questions are not to be dealt with abstractly." *Strax v. Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing*, 588 A.2d 87, 90 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991); *see also Brouillette v. Wolf*, 213 A.3d 341, 367 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019). "The key inquiry in determining whether a case is moot is whether the court . . . will be able to grant effective relief and whether the litigant has been deprived of the necessary stake in the outcome of the litigation." *Consol Pa. Coal. Co., LLC v. Dep't of Env't Prot.*, 129 A.3d 28, 39 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015).

Although a litigant may have had a justiciable claim when the matter was commenced, "events or changes in the facts or the law occur which allegedly deprive the litigant of the necessary stake in the outcome after the suit is underway" will render a matter moot. *Phila. Pub. Sch. Notebook*, 49 A.3d at 448. Senator Corman asserts there was a change in facts, namely S.A.'s and P.M.H.'s graduation, which has rendered Armstrong's and Hughes's claims moot.

The courts have previously found that a student's graduation technically renders a matter involving the student's education moot. *See, e.g., Picone v. Bangor Area Sch. Dist.*, 936 A.2d 556, 560 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007); *Haas v. W. Shore Sch. Dist.*, 915 A.2d 1254, 1258 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007); *Saucon Valley Sch. Dist. v. Robert O.*, 785 A.2d 1069, 1073-74 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001). Here, it is undisputed S.A. and P.M.H. have graduated from high school. Therefore, the Court agrees with Senator Corman that Armstrong's and Hughes's claims on their children's behalf are technically moot.

However, the inquiry does not end there, as here Armstrong and Hughes assert that they also brought the action on their own behalf, Armstrong has another child still in the School District of Philadelphia, and an exception to the mootness doctrine applies, as this matter involves one of great public importance. Finding that the great public importance exception to the mootness doctrine applies here, the Court does not need to resolve Petitioners' other arguments.

The Court may decide a question that is technically moot if one of three exceptions to the mootness doctrine apply. *Saucon Valley*, 785 A.2d at 1073. A court can decide an otherwise moot case: "1) when the case involves questions of great public importance, or 2) when the conduct complained of is capable of repetition yet avoiding review, or 3) when a party to the controversy will suffer some detriment without the court's decision." *Id.* In *Picone*, although the student had graduated from high school, the Court still considered "whether a pellet gun is a 'weapon' pursuant to Section 1317.2 of the Public School Code[of 1949, 24 P.S. § 13-1317.2,[11]]" because it was an issue "capable of repetition yet likely to evade review due to the fact that the student involved may very well serve the term of his

[11] Act of March 10, 1949, P.L. 30, *as amended*, added by Section 4 of the Act of June 30, 1995, P.L. 220, 24 P.S. § 13-1317.2.

or her expulsion prior to the exhaustion of the appeal process." 936 A.2d at 560 n.4. The Court reached a similar conclusion in *Haas*. There, the student had graduated but the Court considered the merits of his expulsion, explaining the student "will suffer a detriment without the court's decision" because the expulsion will appear on his school record and he may need to report it on future applications. 915 A.2d at 1258. Likewise, in *Saucon Valley*, although the student had graduated, the Court considered whether a special education due process appeals review panel exceeded its authority by ordering certain remedies because the issue was capable of repetition yet likely to evade review "[g]iven the relatively accelerated pace that gifted students may advance through school and the time which lapses between a due process hearing, hearing officer decision, [p]anel decision and this Court's consideration . . . ." 785 A.2d at 1073-74.

Here, Petitioners argue Armstrong's and Hughes's claims involve a matter of great public importance, one of the exceptions to the mootness doctrine. For support, Petitioners cite to the Supreme Court's decision when this matter was before it on appeal from this Court's sustaining of preliminary objections. One of the issues was whether the entire action was mooted by the General Assembly's passage of a new funding formula. *William Penn II*, 170 A.3d at 434-35. The Supreme Court concluded the new formula did not render the issue moot. *Id.* at 435. In a footnote, the Supreme Court further stated:

> Even if we were to find that the particular claims presented technically were mooted by the passage of [the new funding formula], Petitioners would have a compelling argument for this Court to proceed to decision on the basis that the issues as stated are of importance to the public interest and "capable of repetition yet evading review." . . . At the inception of any action such as the one presented – **the public importance of which cannot be disputed** – there inheres the risk that

> the General Assembly will move the goalposts by enacting new legislation . . . .

Id. at 435 n.34 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).

While "[t]he great public importance exception to the mootness doctrine is rarely invoked by the [] courts," *County Council of County of Erie v. County Executive of County of Erie*, 600 A.2d 257, 259 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991), the courts have invoked the exception in a number of cases. For instance, in *Jersey Shore Area School District v. Jersey Shore Education Association*, 548 A.2d 1202 (Pa. 1988), the Supreme Court invoked the great public importance exception to decide an otherwise moot case involving a conflict between teachers' statutory right to strike with a school district's duty to provide 180 days of instruction to its pupils. This Court also invoked the exception to decide a case challenging the constitutionality of a statutory amendment and its effect on inmates obtaining parole. *Coady v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole*, 804 A.2d 121, 124 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002). *See also Mifflin Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Stewart*, 503 A.2d 1012 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986) (invoking the great public importance exception in matter involving whether an expelled student had a property right to attend his high school graduation).

The Supreme Court has already stated that this matter involves an issue of great public importance. Armstrong is the only petitioner remaining from the School District of Philadelphia,[12] the largest school district in the Commonwealth, which is not itself a petitioner. Hughes is the only individual petitioner from the Wilkes-Barre School District, and although the Wilkes-Barre School District is a petitioner on its own behalf, its interests may differ from that of a parent of a student within that district. Accordingly, the Court finds that even if Armstrong's and Hughes's

[12] Previously, there was another individual petitioner from the School District of Philadelphia, but that petitioner voluntarily withdrew in 2019.

claims are technically moot, they should not be dismissed as this matter involves an issue of great public importance.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, Senator Corman's Application is denied.

RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

William Penn School District; Panther Valley School District; The School District of Lancaster; Greater Johnstown School District; Wilkes-Barre Area School District; Shenandoah Valley School District; Jamella and Bryant Miller, parents of K.M., a minor; Sheila Armstrong, parent of S.A., minor; Barbara Nemeth, parent of C.M., minor; Tracey Hughes, parent of P.M.H., minor; Pennsylvania Association of Rural and Small Schools; and The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People-Pennsylvania State Conference, Petitioners	:	
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O R D E R

NOW, March 8, 2021, the Application for Partial Summary Relief filed by Senator Jake Corman, President Pro Tempore of the Pennsylvania Senate, is **DENIED**.

RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge